Spain did not need a spectacular tactical invention to beat Belgium in the 2026 World Cup quarter-final. They needed to keep doing what they had done well all tournament, survive the moments when Belgium made that approach uncomfortable, and then make the right substitution at the right time.
The result was a 2-1 win at SoFi Stadium in Inglewood on July 10, with Fabián Ruiz putting Spain ahead, Charles De Ketelaere equalising before half-time and Mikel Merino scoring the decisive goal in the 88th minute. (skysports.com)
The numbers explain why Spain deserved to advance, but they do not quite explain why the game stayed level for so long. Spain had roughly 68 percent possession, 17 shots to Belgium's five and eight shots on target to Belgium's two. Their expected-goals advantage was similarly large: Opta recorded 2.08 xG for Spain against 0.37 for Belgium. (es.concacaf.com)
Belgium's plan was therefore not to compete with Spain for control. It was to make Spain's control less dangerous than it looked.
Spain changed one midfielder and kept the same basic structure
Luis de la Fuente made one change from the side that had beaten Portugal in the round of 16. Fabián Ruiz replaced Pedri in midfield, joining Rodri in the starting double pivot. Spain lined up nominally in a 4-2-3-1, with Lamine Yamal and Álex Baena supporting Dani Olmo behind Mikel Oyarzabal. (theguardian.com)
That selection mattered because Fabián offered Spain another player capable of arriving into the attacking line without abandoning the midfield structure.
Rodri remained the central reference point. Spain could circulate possession through him, draw Belgium's midfield toward the ball and then look for the next pass into Olmo, Yamal or the advancing full-backs.
This was not possession for possession's sake. Spain were trying to create a numerical and positional advantage around Belgium's compact defensive block.
The official match data backs up how completely Spain controlled the ball: 90 percent passing accuracy compared with 78 percent for Belgium, alongside the 68-32 possession split. (es.concacaf.com)
Belgium accepted long periods without the ball
Rudi Garcia's Belgium also started in a 4-2-3-1, with Youri Raskin and Hans Vanaken behind Kevin De Bruyne, Jérémy Doku and Leandro Trossard, while De Ketelaere operated as the central attacking reference. (es.concacaf.com)
The shape gave Belgium a fairly clear priority: stay compact enough that Spain's possession did not automatically become penetration.
That distinction is important. Spain could move the ball from side to side, but Belgium were trying to prevent the final pass from becoming easy. When Spain did lose the ball, Belgium wanted De Bruyne and Doku in positions where the first forward action could attack the space behind Spain's advancing players.
It worked often enough to keep the game alive.
Belgium created only five shots in total, but their goal illustrated exactly why a low-possession strategy could still hurt Spain. Charles De Ketelaere headed in Timothy Castagne's cross in the 41st minute, cancelling out Spain's lead. (skysports.com)
Spain had controlled the match. Belgium had still found the goal that mattered.
Fabián Ruiz gave Spain the lead by following the attack
Spain's opener in the 30th minute came from a situation that also exposed Belgium's defensive vulnerability.
Fabián Ruiz finished from close range after Thibaut Courtois failed to hold the initial effort. Spain had worked the ball into the attacking area and, crucially, had players positioned to attack the second action rather than simply watching the goalkeeper's save. (skysports.com)
That made the goal more significant than a simple rebound.
Spain were repeatedly trying to put Belgium's defenders and goalkeeper into decisions inside their own penalty area. When the first attempt was not cleanly dealt with, Fabián was there.
Belgium's equaliser showed the opposite side of the match. Castagne's delivery found De Ketelaere, who attacked the cross and headed beyond Unai Simón. It was Belgium's first goal against Spain at the tournament and ended Spain's run of six consecutive clean sheets. (theanalyst.com)
For 649 minutes, according to Opta, Spain had gone without conceding at the World Cup. Belgium finally broke that sequence.
Lamine Yamal was Spain's most persistent attacking outlet
Spain's attacking structure repeatedly gave Yamal opportunities to receive the ball on the right and then attack from there.
The winger did not simply stay wide waiting for crosses. He could carry the ball inside, combine with the players around him and attempt to create the final action himself.
Sky Sports recorded six efforts at goal and four successful dribbles for Yamal, describing Spain's build-up as being heavily fed through him. (skysports.com)
One of his clearest opportunities came shortly after half-time. Pau Cubarsí released Yamal, but Courtois denied him one-on-one. Later, Courtois also saved from Yamal and Oyarzabal. (skysports.com)
That sequence tells the story of the second half.
Spain were creating the opportunities. Belgium were increasingly relying on Courtois to prevent those opportunities from becoming goals.
Belgium's best attacks came when Doku and De Bruyne escaped Spain's control
Belgium were not completely passive.
One of their more dangerous second-half attacks came when Doku combined with De Bruyne, allowing Maxim De Cuyper to get behind Spain's defensive line. De Cuyper's resulting effort went wide. (skysports.com)
That was the counter-argument to Spain's territorial dominance.
If Spain pushed players forward and Belgium could get Doku running, De Bruyne could become the player who turned a defensive recovery into an immediate attacking situation.
But Belgium could not reproduce those sequences often enough. Five total shots against Spain's 17 is the clearest statistical expression of the problem. (theanalyst.com)
Spain were giving Belgium some opportunities, but not enough of them.
Courtois' injury changed the final phase of the match
The biggest non-tactical turning point arrived in the 72nd minute.
Courtois, who had already made several important saves, was forced off injured. Senne Lammens replaced him in goal. (skysports.com)
That substitution changed the risk calculation for Belgium.
Lammens was not responsible for Belgium's inability to create more possession or chances. But Spain had spent the match repeatedly testing the Belgian penalty area, and Courtois had already demonstrated that he could keep the score level.
The replacement goalkeeper immediately inherited a game in which one mistake could decide the quarter-final.
That is exactly what happened.
Merino's introduction was a small substitution with a huge effect
De la Fuente waited until the 86th minute to introduce Mikel Merino for Dani Olmo. Two minutes later, Merino had scored.
The goal was not a complicated set-piece routine or a long passing sequence. Pau Cubarsí's low shot was spilled by Lammens, and Merino reacted first to the rebound. He had been on the pitch for only 117 seconds and scored with his second touch. (skysports.com)
That makes Merino's role worth separating from the idea that Spain simply got lucky.
Yes, the decisive moment depended on a goalkeeper error. But Spain had spent the previous 85 minutes creating enough pressure for such an error to matter. They were still attacking when the match was level, and Merino was positioned to attack the loose ball.
He had also scored the late winner against Portugal in the previous round. His quarter-final goal therefore continued an unusually direct knockout-stage pattern: Merino was becoming Spain's late-game problem solver rather than merely a midfielder waiting for minutes.
He became the first player to score winning goals as a substitute in two different knockout matches at a World Cup. (skysports.com)
Spain won because Belgium could contain the game, not control it
The most revealing statistic from the quarter-final is probably not possession. It is the gap between chances.
Spain finished with 17 shots and 2.08 expected goals according to Opta. Belgium had five shots and 0.37 xG. (theanalyst.com)
Belgium's defensive approach was good enough to keep Spain from turning dominance into an early multi-goal lead. That is why the match was 1-1 for most of the second half.
But containment is different from control.
Spain continued to bring Yamal into the attack. Rodri continued to dictate the circulation. Their full-backs could advance, their midfielders could arrive around the box and their substitutes added fresh attacking options.
Belgium needed another decisive counter, a set piece or a moment of individual quality from De Bruyne or Doku. Spain needed only one more successful attacking sequence.
They got it in the 88th minute.
The quarter-final was therefore a fairly precise demonstration of how Spain's football worked at its best in 2026. The possession was not the objective. The objective was to keep creating situations in which Belgium had to defend, keep enough players close to the attack to exploit second balls, and trust the structure to survive the few moments when Belgium escaped.
The final goal came from a goalkeeper mistake, but Spain's ability to be there when it happened was not accidental.
Merino's finish sent Spain into the semi-finals against France. Two matches remained between De la Fuente's side and the World Cup final, and the quarter-final had already shown the trait that would define their run: Spain could dominate a match without needing the scoreline to reflect that dominance for most of the night. When the decisive opening finally appeared, they were ready to take it.
